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I have expressed the view—and it may be a view that I’ll have to be educated
on further if I am confirmed, and I am not stating it as a solid view. I do
think there is room for the Court to take more cases. They hear about half
the number of cases they did 25 years ago. There may be good reasons for
that that I will learn if I am confirmed, but just looking at it from the outside,
I think they could contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of the law
by taking more cases. 1
– Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE DUTY TO DECIDE
“The duty to decide is the primary judicial duty.” 2 If one agrees with Judge
Posner, then the Roberts Court is shirking its primary duty. Empirically, the
Roberts Court is the least productive of any Supreme Court. 3 It averages less than
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law.
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 337 (2005) [hereinafter Confirmation
Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts Jr.).
2. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 56 (2005).
3. See generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1930, 45 HARV. L. REV. 271 (1931). In 1926, then-Professor Frankfurter began reporting
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70 signed opinions per year. 4 When per curiam 5 opinions are included, the
decisional average rises to 76 cases per Term. 6 These numbers are less than onethird the decisional average for the 1926 7 and 1930 Taft Courts.8 The Roberts
Court fares no better when compared to recent predecessor Courts, falling well
below the averages of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. 9 Even as the
Roberts Court decides fewer cases, it continues to write a record number of nondecisional opinions. 10 These separate concurring and dissenting opinions have
annual Supreme Court statistics for the Harvard Law Review. See generally Felix Frankfurter, Business
of the Supreme Court of the United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1046
(1926). Professor Frankfurter’s statistics remind that in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court decided far more cases due to its mandatory appellate jurisdiction. For example, in 1885, the
Court disposed of 440 cases; in 1886, the Court disposed of 451 cases; and, in 1890, the Court
disposed of 610 cases. Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 272 n.3. These numbers are hard to digest
today where the Court’s jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary. However, even when comparing
the Roberts Court to Courts with mostly discretionary jurisdiction, the Roberts Court lags in
productivity. Compared to the Taft Court during the 1926 Term through the 1930 Term, the
Roberts Court’s decisional output is one-third that produced by a less modernized, less professionally
staffed institution. Id. at 273, 290.
4. When averaging the number of signed opinions, which exclude per curiam opinions, from
the 2005 through the 2017 Term, the Roberts Court has averaged 67 signed opinions per Term.
These figures come from the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary issued annually
and available on the United States Supreme Court website. Chief Justice Year-End Reports on the Fed.
Judiciary, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/yearendreports.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9B3-ZWUC] (last visited July 14, 2019). The low mark was 59
signed opinions in 2017. The high mark was 75 signed opinions in 2010. In only four of these
thirteen Terms has the Roberts Court exceeded 70 signed opinions (2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012).
5. SCOTUSblog defines “per curiam opinion” as “an unsigned opinion, written for the court
as a whole by an unidentified justice.” (In Latin, “per curiam” means “by the court.”) Glossary of
Supreme Court Terms, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educationalresources/glossary-of-legal-terms/ [https://perma.cc/XC9Q-ES67] (last visited July 14, 2019). In
contrast, “written dissents from per curiam opinions are signed.” Id.
6. This average is taken from the Harvard Law Review’s “Statistics,” which has been compiling
Supreme Court data since 1928. The modern statistics reports are available on Harvard Law Review’s
webpage. Statistics, HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawreview.org/category/statistics/
[https://perma.cc/S662-QQ4X] (last visited July 14, 2019). The Roberts Court’s annual record is 81
total opinions in 2005; 73 in 2006; 70 in 2007; 78 in 2008; 87 in 2009; 82 in 2010; 75 in 2011; 78
in 2012; 72 in 2013; 74 in 2014; 75 in 2015; 69 in 2016; and 71 in 2017. Id.
7. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2006). Dean Starr created a table detailing “The Supreme Court
and Its Docket: 1926–2004.” Id. Per this table, the 1926 Taft Court issued 223 signed opinions. Id.
That year, 1,183 cases were on the docket. Id. Of these, nearly 19% were disposed of through signed
opinions. Id.
8. Id. Per Starr’s table, the 1930 Taft Court issued 235 signed opinions. Id. That year, 1,304
cases were on the docket. Id. Of these, nearly 18% were disposed of through signed opinions. Id.
Although case filings rose nearly 100 cases from 1926 to 1930, the Taft Court also responded with
an increase of 12 additional decisions. Id.
9. Id. Notably, the decisional numbers peaked under Justice Taft and have vacillated—though
with a steady output experienced during the Warren and, particularly, Burger Courts. Id. It was not
until the Rehnquist Court that the Supreme Court consistently fell below 100 signed opinions per
Term. Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/48MQ-WA8B] (noting that the Roberts Court’s 2005 decisional output of 69
signed opinions “was the lowest since 1953 and fewer than half the number the court was deciding
as recently as the mid-1980s”).
10. Adam Liptak, Justices are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html
[https://perma.cc/6UTE-F9SL]
(observing that the Roberts Court set the record for concurring opinions). “In the last term, there
was at least one concurring opinion in 77 percent of unanimous rulings. That is a record.” Id.
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outnumbered majority opinions in all but one Term that Roberts has served as
Chief Justice. 11 In fact, in 2007, the Court issued more dissenting opinions (72)
than majority opinions. 12
How do we evaluate a Supreme Court that writes more than it decides?13
Despite having the lowest decisional output in the modern era, the Roberts Court
is the most verbose Supreme Court in history. 14 The current Justices are more
likely than past Justices to have their individual say in cases, writing more
concurring and dissenting opinions than prior Courts. 15 These opinions are
longer, often strongly worded, and rarely add clarity to the underlying decision.16
The Roberts Court has shifted from being a decisional body to becoming an
institution that comments on more cases than it decides.
This article critiques the Roberts Court’s tendency to overwrite and underdecide. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s Senate testimony asserting that the
Supreme Court should take more cases, the Roberts Court has fallen below the
previous recorded lows of the Rehnquist Court. 17 Returning to Chief Justice
Roberts’s goal for the Court to be more productive, 18 this article offers two
11. See Statistics, supra note 6. For example, in 2005, the Roberts Court issued a total of 176
written opinions, but only 81 opinions of the Court. Id. The 2006 numbers were similar: a total of
175 written opinions, but only 73 opinions of the Court. Id. In both years, there were more than 60
dissenting opinions and more than 35 concurring opinions. Id. The greatest output in both years,
which is characteristic of the Roberts Court, was individualized opinions—95 in 2005 and 102 in
2006. Id. In 2013, the Court issued the same number of total majority opinions as separate opinions—
72 each. Id. In every other year, separate opinions outnumbered majority opinions. Id.
12. Id. In 2007, the Court also issued 45 concurring opinions. Id. In 2008, the Court issued just
one more majority opinion than dissenting opinion—78 majority opinions and 77 dissenting
opinions. Id. That same year, the Court issued 43 concurring opinions. Id.
13. This article analyzes decisional output by signed opinion—not simply case disposition. This
is similar to the Harvard format that keeps statistics on actual written opinions (opinions of the court,
concurrences, and dissents). It does not include per curiam opinions. Interestingly, the author’s
capturing statistics do not appear to use any one governing statistical model since the numbers often
vary among authors.
14. Meg Penrose, Supreme Verbosity: The Roberts Court’s Expanding Legacy, 102 MARQ. L. REV.
163, 175–76 (2018).
15. Historically, other Courts were less likely to publish their dissenting and concurring
opinions. Keeping with the Taft Court example, only four of the nine Justices issued any concurring
opinion. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 290. And, in 1926, of the 199 non-per curiam
opinions, those four Justices only published 7 concurring opinions—or a concurring opinion in 4%
of the total cases. Id. The numbers are even starker in subsequent years. In 1927, two Justices
accounted for a total of 2 concurring opinions out of 175 non-per curiam opinions. Id. In 1928, one
Justice accounted for a total of 2 concurring opinions out of 129 non-per curiam opinions. Id. In
1929, one Justice accounted for a total of 3 concurring opinions out of 134 non-per curiam opinions.
Id. Finally, in 1930, one Justice accounted for a single concurring opinion out of 166 non-per curiam
opinions. Id. To help place these numbers in perspective, in 2007 every Justice on the Roberts Court
filed at least 1 concurring opinion. Statistics, supra note 6. In fact, three Justices (Stevens, Scalia, and
Thomas) individually issued more concurring opinions in one Term than the entire Taft Court did
in 1926. Id. An even more remarkable comparison is the Roberts Court’s 2009 Term in which Justice
Scalia himself issued as many concurring opinions in a single year (15) as the entire Taft Court issued
over a five-year period (1926–1930). See id. Justice Thomas also equaled the Taft Court’s five-year
total, issuing 15 concurring opinions in 2017. See id.
16. Meg Penrose, Enough Said: A Proposal for Shortening Supreme Court Opinions, 19 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 50, 54–56 (2018–2019).
17. See Greenhouse, supra note 9. “The sharpest drop in opinions came after William H.
Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986.” Id.; see also Starr, supra note 7, at 1368.
18. See Greenhouse, supra note 9 (noting that the Roberts Court’s 2005 decisional output of 69
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solutions: the Court should stop publishing (1) signed opinions and (2) separate
opinions. At a time when government feels strained, if not broken, the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to decide actual controversies—but allowing each Justice to
publish their separate ideas on each decision—merits serious discussion. Should
the average number of dissents (56) rival the average number of signed majority
decisions (67)? And what are the opportunity costs of a Court that averages 31
more separate opinions each Term (98 total, comprised of 56 dissenting opinions
and 43 concurring opinions) than decisional opinions?
Ironically, Chief Justice Roberts has spoken on his Court’s tendencies to
individualize the law. In a 2007 interview, Chief Justice Roberts admonished that
“every justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re writing
separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.” 19 Looking at the
numbers, it truly is time to worry. It is also time for the Justices to return to the
Court’s primary duty—the duty to decide.
II. THE HISTORY: STATISTICS, LEGISLATION, AND DECISIONAL
OUTPUT
In the late 1920s, then-Professor Felix Frankfurter 20 began keeping “statistics”
on the business of the Supreme Court. 21 The format he selected included, among
other things, the total number of cases decided, the number of majority opinions
written by each individual Justice, the number of concurring opinions written by
each Justice, and the number of dissenting opinions written by each Justice.22
Frankfurter’s work is remarkable for two reasons: (1) its content and (2) its
longevity. With little change, the current Harvard Law Review has carried on
Frankfurter’s tradition of keeping decisional statistics on the Supreme Court. 23
Following each Term, interested readers can go to the Harvard Law Review
statistics and gather empirical data on the preceding Court Term.
Frankfurter’s early statistics provide dramatic comparison between the Court’s
nineteenth-century productivity and its modern record. Where once Justices were
reluctant to issue separate concurring and dissenting opinions, 24 the individual
signed opinions “was the lowest since 1953 and fewer than half the number the court was deciding
as recently as the mid-1980s”); see also Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of John G.
Roberts Jr.).
19. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 105.
20. Felix Frankfurter was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1939. He served as a Justice until 1962. See About the Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/K94Q-ZSXH] (last
visited July 14, 2019).
21. See generally Frankfurter, supra note 3.
22. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 290–91.
23. Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The “Administrative Side” of Chief
Justice Roberts, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 33, 33–36 (2015). Professor Lazarus notes that “The Business of
the Supreme Court deliberately focused on the statistics of the Court’s work, rather than on the
substance of the Court’s rulings.” Id. at 35.
24. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361, 362–
63 (1973). Justice Rehnquist noted that the 1923 Taft Court handed down 208 signed opinions with
only 15 separate concurring or dissenting opinions. Id. Compared to today’s Justices, the Taft Court
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Justices on the Roberts Court often write more (sometimes twice as many)
concurring and dissenting opinions as they do majority opinions. 25 The Court’s
movement from over-deciding to overwriting did not take place at once, or even
under a single Chief Justice. 26 Since Chief Justice William Howard Taft petitioned
Congress to pass the Judiciary Act of 1925, Justices have continued to lament their
workload. 27 Chief Justice Taft encouraged Congress to pass what became known
as “the Judges’ Bill,” legislation that removed much of the Supreme Court’s
mandatory appellate jurisdiction. 28 This change enabled the Supreme Court to
manage its growing docket by allowing it to largely select the cases it would resolve.
Even with this change, the Taft Court continued to decide a large number of
cases—nearly three times as many as the Roberts Court does today. 29
The Judges’ Bill, however, did not sufficiently address the Supreme Court’s
increasing docket. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and others lobbied Congress
to again act to stem the growing tide of cases. While the Taft Court struggled to
manage 1,200 to 1,300 annual filings, the Burger Court was wrestling with
approximately 5,000. 30 And each year those totals grew. 31 The Burger Court,
however, managed to annually resolve nearly 3% of the cases filed, averaging
around 150 signed opinions most years.32 The advancement of writing technology
may have helped, but the Court was still struggling.33
Then, William H. Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice. During his Senate

issued separate opinions only 7% of the time.
25. In 2007, both Justices Stevens and Scalia drafted more than twice the number of separate
opinions as they did majority opinions for the Court. Justice Stevens authored 7 majority opinions
but 8 concurring opinions and 13 dissents. Similarly, Justice Scalia authored 8 majority opinions but
10 concurring opinions and 8 dissents. See The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 516–17 (2008)
[hereinafter The Statistics 2008]. The following Term—2008—Justices Breyer and Alito posted similar
numbers. Justice Breyer authored 8 majority opinions with 8 concurring opinions and 14 dissents.
Justice Alito authored 7 majority opinions with 8 concurring opinions and 7 dissents. See The
Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 382–84 (2009). The 2009 Term was a particularly bad year, as four
of the nine Justices issued at least twice as many separate opinions as majority opinions. Justice
Stevens wrote 13 concurrences and 14 dissents to accompany his 6 majority opinions. Justice Scalia
wrote 15 concurrences and 6 dissents while authoring 8 majority opinions. Justice Thomas, who
authored 8 majority opinions, wrote 13 concurrences and 5 dissents. And Justice Alito wrote 10
concurrences and 7 dissents, compared to his 8 majority opinions. See The Statistics, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 411, 411–13 (2010). These trends are neither changing nor slowing. In 2014, Justice Thomas
authored 7 majority opinions while also writing 10 concurring opinions and 20 dissents. That same
Term, Justice Alito drafted 8 majority opinions to go with his 8 concurring opinions and 14 dissents.
See The Statistics, 129 HARV. L. REV. 381, 381–83 (2015). And finally, during Justice Gorsuch’s first
Term on the bench in 2016, he wrote 1 majority opinion but 2 concurrences and 2 dissents. See The
Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 403–05 (2017).
26. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1228 (2012).
27. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937 (1925).
28. Id.; see also Michael Schwartz, Our Fractured Supreme Court, HOOVER INST. (Jan. 29, 2005),
https://www.hoover.org/research/our-fractured-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/JRZ5-TRUU].
29. See Starr, supra note 7, at 1369.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Owens & Simon, supra note 26, at 1228. Owens and Simon explain that while the
Supreme Court was deciding “roughly 177 cases per term” during the 1940s, the numbers dropped
to an average of 124 per Term during the 1950s. Id.
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confirmation testimony, Justice Rehnquist was asked about the Court’s docket.
He was specifically asked whether the “volume of cases preclude[d] wise
adjudication” and whether the Court was “overburdened.” 34 In response, Justice
Rehnquist indicated that he thought “the 150 cases that we have turned out quite
regularly over a period of 10 or 15 years is just about where we should be at.” 35
Following his confirmation, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s viewpoint apparently
changed. He successfully lobbied Congress to eliminate the remaining vestiges of
the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. 36 In an act “to improve the
administration of justice by providing greater discretion to the Supreme Court in
selecting the cases it will review,” Congress gave near-complete license to the
Court to select its docket.37 Thereafter, the Rehnquist Court began deciding fewer
and fewer cases. 38 It cut its decisional output by 50%, going from 146 signed
opinions during its first Term to 74 in its last.39 Despite constant increases in case
filings, Supreme Court productivity—measured in decisional opinions—went
down. 40
Enter Chief Justice John Roberts Jr.
III. THE CONUNDRUM: INCREASING RESOURCES, DECREASING
OUTPUT
The Roberts Court holds the record for saying the most (the longest average
length for opinions) and deciding the least. 41 Its modest decisional output is
inversely related to its increased resources over past Courts. Even as case filings
have dropped below their height at the end of the Rehnquist Court and the
beginning of the Roberts Court, the Court has not improved its decisional
activity. 42 The past eight Terms have actually seen a significant decrease in case
filings—from a high of 8,857 cases filed to the new normal of around 6,300 to

34. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 143 (1986) (question from Senator Mathias).
35. Id. (response of Hon. William H. Rehnquist).
36. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
37. Id.
38. See also Owens & Simon, supra note 26, at 1228 (“By the 2000 Term, the [Rehnquist] Court
heard only 87 cases.”).
39. Starr, supra note 7, at 1368.
40. Posner, supra note 2, at 35 (noting that, even as the number of reviewable decisions was
growing, the number of “decisions reviewed by the [Supreme] Court” declined).
41. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 10 (“In decisions on questions great and small, the [Roberts
Court] often provides only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts. And it increasingly does
so at enormous length.”). Liptak further noted that the Roberts Court “decides perhaps 75 cases a
term these day, down from about 150 in the mid-1980s.” Id.
42. Relying on the Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports maintained on the Supreme Court website,
the Rehnquist Court saw filings increase in 1999 (7,377), 2000 (7,852), 2001 (7,924), and 2002
(8,255). See Chief Justice Year-End Reports on the Fed. Judiciary, supra note 4. Filings, however, decreased
the next two years: 2003 (7,814) and 2004 (7,496). Id. The highest number of cases ever filed occurred
during Chief Justice Roberts’s first two Terms: 2005 (8,521) and 2006 (8,857). Id. During the next
three years, case filings remained steady: 2007 (8,241), 2008 (7,738), and 2009 (8,159). Id. Since
2009, case filings have continually declined: 2010 (7,857), 2011 (7,713), 2012 (7,509), 2013 (7,376),
2014 (7,033), 2015 (6,475), 2016 (6,305), and 2017 (6,315). Id.
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6,400. 43 While past Justices “rode circuit,” had minimal administrative staff, and
wrote decisions in longhand, the Roberts Court has modern advantages prior
Courts lacked. 44 There are more law clerks than ever before, providing assistance
not only with screening incoming certiorari petitions but also with opinion
drafting. 45 The Justices and their clerks need not leave their desks to do research
or review briefs—they can perform word searches, electronically read the record,
and cut and paste their writing on computers. Today’s Court personnel have the
easiest burden when it comes to research and writing. There is no need to pull
books from the shelves or check citations manually. Everything, literally, is a click
away. So, why are we experiencing such low decisional output?
The strange juxtaposition of decisional output with optimal resources is
troubling. Now that writing is easier—and support staff far greater—shouldn’t the
Justices be deciding more cases rather than writing more individual opinions?
Shouldn’t the Court be striving to perform its primary decisional duty rather than
seeking to write individual opinions that, as Justice Scalia noted, will likely never
become the law? 46 The problem of overwriting and under-deciding is only
exacerbated by society’s ability to gain access to the Justices’ written work. What
are citizens to make of these lengthy—and varied—individual opinions that seem
to undermine decisional clarity? When turning to the Court to learn “what the
law is,” how will citizens be able to know with any measure of certainty what the
law is when the Justices spend more time on drafting separate opinions than on
finding consensus? Where is the clarity and uniformity that Chief Justice Roberts
spoke of?
“The Justices now do decide fewer cases and thus have more time to spend
discussing each one—should they desire to.” 47 Unfortunately, those discussions—
if they are occurring—are only made visible in increased separate filings rather than
greater consensus. Other scholars have noted that “matters are made much worse
by the fact that there is too little genuine internal deliberation on the Supreme
Court.” 48 In their view, “this is at least partly due to the efforts of individual
Justices to develop and exhibit their own personal views of the Constitution and
to resist accommodation with others on the Court.” 49
43. Id.
44. Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2010) (noting that the early Justices “had no clerks, no secretaries,
no librarians; and yet they issued opinions within days, or at most weeks, after oral argument”).
45. Id. at 1268. In comparing the early Court, Lerner and Lund remind that:
Between 1874 and 1924, the Court was burdened with a workload that would be
regarded as staggering today, usually hearing more than 200 or even 250 cases per
year. Some Justices had a single clerk to assist, but most had none. Today’s Supreme
Court occupies a brave new world: a docket of eighty-odd cases, with four law clerks
and two secretaries assigned to each Justice.
Id.
46. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 37. Justice Scalia noted
that, at the Supreme Court level, dissents rarely help change the law. Id.
47. Posner, supra note 2, at 66.
48. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1671, 1700 (2004).
49. Id.
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Since 2005, the Roberts Court’s Justices have consistently written more
separate opinions than dispositive opinions. 50 Each January, the Chief Justice
issues an annual report detailing the Supreme Court’s workload. 51 But one detail
that is missing from this report is captured by Harvard Law Review’s annual endof-Term statistics—the number of separate opinions written by each Justice.
Looking just at Chief Justice Roberts’s 2008 annual report, we learn that the
Supreme Court filings decreased that year by 7% (from 8,857 cases filed in 2006
to 8,241 cases filed in 2007). 52 The Court disposed of 72 cases in 67 signed
opinions. 53 Yet, this number is remarkably incomplete. The 67 signed opinions
refer solely to majority opinions. 54 What Chief Justice Roberts does not reveal is
that eight of the nine Justices, including the Chief Justice, wrote more separate
opinions in 2007 than majority opinions. 55 Every Justice but Justice Kennedy
invested more time responding to the Court’s decision in a given case than issuing
decisional opinions. 56 Three of the Justices wrote at least twice as many separate
opinions as majority opinions (Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas).57 And one
Justice, Justice Stevens, wrote three times as many separate opinions as majority
opinions. 58 In total, the Justices drafted 187 separate opinions to resolve 72
cases.59
Imagine the additional cases that could be considered, if not resolved, with that
time investment. The proliferation of individual opinions adds, unnecessarily, to
a polarized and politicized society by focusing on individual Justices as opposed to
one Supreme Court. Clarity suffers. Law suffers. Institutional integrity suffers.
The Justices are increasingly judging in their individual capacities rather than
speaking with one voice—opting for individual expression over institutional
clarity. The Court with more resources than any in history is deciding less but
saying more. The Justices largely choose the cases they want to resolve and then
often decide to each comment at length about their respective constitutional
50. See Statistics, supra note 6.
51. The United States Supreme Court keeps this information. See Chief Justice Year-End Reports
on the Fed. Judiciary, supra note 4. In addition, annual case load statistics are available from the
Supreme Court under its Journal tab. See Journal, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx [https://perma.cc/59YN-AG7W] (last visited
July 14, 2019).
52. See JOHN G. ROBERTS JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V72B-P43U].
53. Id.
54. This number also excludes the 3 per curiam opinions noted by Harvard Law Review for 2007.
The Statistics 2008, supra note 25, at 516–17.
55. See id.
56. Id. During the 2007 Term, every Justice wrote at least 1 concurring opinion and at least 4
dissenting opinions. Id. In total, the Justices drafted 45 concurring opinions and 72 dissenting
opinions. Id. While the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report indicates that 72 cases were resolved, the
Harvard statistics indicate that only 70 opinions of the Court were drafted to resolve those cases. Id.
57. Id. Justice Stevens wrote 21 separate opinions compared to 7 majority opinions. Id. Justice
Scalia wrote 18 separate opinions compared to 8 majority opinions. Id. Finally, Justice Thomas wrote
17 separate opinions compared to 7 majority opinions. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Harvard notes that while 72 decisions may have been rendered, the Court only issued 70
opinions “of the Court” to do so. Id.
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interpretations. The Justices increasingly shine the light on themselves, not the
Constitution. This practice should stop.
IV. THE SOLUTION: NO MORE SEPARATE OPINIONS
The Court should return its focus to its decisional responsibilities. Article III
vests the Supreme Court with the power to resolve cases and controversies. 60 And,
while the Constitution does not direct how the resolution of those cases and
controversies should be communicated, the Roberts Court’s approach of writing
lengthy, fractured opinions is not helping to clearly communicate the law. The
Court’s numerous separate opinions are making the law less accessible to the
average person. When each Justice has to have his or her say, readers struggle to
know what the law is and whether a majority opinion means what it says. This is
particularly problematic when the Court is unable to provide a united front in
controversial and complicated cases. The most recent example happened this
Term.
On June 20, 2019, Justice Alito read his “majority” opinion from the Supreme
Court bench in one of the Term’s most anticipated First Amendment cases.61
Upon finishing, and before announcing the separate opinions in the case, he
jokingly indicated that “my colleagues and I have been quite prolific in our
writing.” 62 This line would be funny were it not so emblematic of the Roberts
Court’s legacy. The case begins:
ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, II–C, III, and IV, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A and II–D, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed
a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part.
THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J.,
joined. 63
Seven of the nine Justices wrote individual opinions in the case. This separate
writing approach subverts the Court’s decisional role by emphasizing the Justices’
individual ideas over their institutional positions. Worse still, it elevates writing
over deciding. “The proper functions of an opinion are to succinctly express the
court’s reasons why it decided as it did, to develop the law, and to force the author
to think through the decision.” 64 The Court’s many opinions in the American
60. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
61. See generally Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
62. Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: “Quite Prolific in Our Writing”, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2019, 5:54 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-quiteprolific-in-our-writing/ [https://perma.cc/7PF5-BEKF].
63. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2067.
64. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague, 5
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Legion case failed on all points: seven Justices, eighty-one pages. It is time for
change. 65
This article proposes a solution to the Court’s problem of overwriting and
under-deciding: eliminate both signed opinions and separate opinions. Were the
Court simply to decide cases—without attributing names to its opinions—the
notoriety incentive would disappear and more work would likely get done. 66 The
Court should issue only a single unsigned majority opinion. The shift to issuing
per curiam opinions, or unsigned opinions for the Court, would help “place
emphasis on the serious nature of the Court’s decisions, not on how scintillating
or sparkling the language and writing style of its individual members might be.” 67
Separate opinions have yielded little fruit in the modern era and are distracting
from the Court’s decisional duties.
The Court should publish only the decision “of the Court” by “the Court”
without attributing a decision to any particular Justice. 68 The Supreme Court is a
governmental institution. And the Justices should strive to fulfill their
institutional duties by agreeing to lend their talents, not their name, to its final
decisions.
Like Chief Justice John Marshall, this author believes it is the voice of the
Court, not the individual author, that matters. 69 In calling for an end to the
“culture of signed majority opinions,” Professors Craig S. Lerner and Nelson
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 47 (1994–1995).
65. In 2005, right before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court, a similar decision was rendered
in a First Amendment case involving the Ten Commandments. The start of that opinion is nearly
identical:
REHNQUIST, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and
THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J.,
joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 679 (2005). In Van Orden, the Supreme Court analyzed whether
a six-foot tall statute of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds was
constitutionally permitted. This case, like the American Legion case, produced seven separate opinions
and spanned seventy-one pages. Id.
66. Lerner & Lund, supra note 44, at 1231.
67. Nygaard, supra note 64, at 45.
68. The author is not the first person to call for this change. Judge Richard Lowell Nygaard did
so in the mid-1990s, with the immediate disclaimer the change would never occur. See id. at 41. Judge
Nygaard began “by stating [his] not so-tentative hypothesis that the practice by appellate courts of
issuing signed opinions is obsolete and counterproductive. It should be abolished.” Id. Similar calls
for eliminating signed opinions have been made by Lerner and Lund. Lerner & Lund, supra note 44,
at 1231 (“The solution we propose is a simple one: by statute, Justices should no longer be permitted
to affix their names to the opinions—majority, concurring, or dissenting—that they file.”); see also Peter
Bozzo, The Jurisprudence of as Though: Democratic Dialogue and the Signed Supreme Court Opinion, 26
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 269, 299 (2014); James Markham, Against Individually Signed Opinions, 56 DUKE
L.J. 923, 927 (2006); Scott S. Boddery, How to Turn Down Political Heat on the Supreme Court and
Federal Judges: Stop Signing Opinions, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:02AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/12/07/political-attacks-judges-unsigned-opinionsturn-down-heat-column/2207443002/ [https://perma.cc/YA2J-DTFU]; Suzanna Sherry, Our
Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It) 10–20 (July 29, 2019) (unpublished article),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425998.
69. Nygaard, supra note 64, at 45.
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Lund note:
Today, one Justice writes an “opinion for the Court” (or tries to do so—
sometimes there is no majority opinion at all), and other Justices trumpet
their disagreements, from the trivial to the profound, in multiple concurring
and dissenting opinions. This practice can create tensions with the
traditional ideal of the rule of law, and it does not consistently produce
much in the way of compensating benefits. 70
The American Legion case serves merely as the most recent example. Lerner and
Lund, like others calling for the end to signed opinions, argue that eliminating
individual attribution will lead to greater institutional credibility. 71 It might also
lessen the incentives for separate writing. 72
The modern practice of separate writing has grown out of control. Justice Scalia
famously said he writes his dissents “for law students.” 73 But that approach has
moved far afield from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s “appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day.” 74 Separate opinions
should not be the occasion to undermine the majority opinion, chastise fellow
Justices, or further politicize the Supreme Court. All opinions are not equal. Only
majority opinions are the law—regardless of whether at some later time another
idea might become the law. In contrast to separate opinions and their aspirational
nature, the majority opinion being issued is not contingent. The opinion of the
Court is the law.
Yet under the current framework, every opinion appears outwardly equal and
is printed seriatim to allow each Justice to share his or her respective thoughts.
This is true even if a Justice speaks alone in an attempt to discredit the majority’s
legal decision—or comments on matters not even before the Court. In true
democratic fashion, there should be a singular opinion “for the Court” that
provides only the opinion voted on by the largest number of Justices signing on
to that opinion. Separate, signed opinions add little institutional value while
adding a great deal of mischief. The law needs to be clear and needs to be clearly
communicated. Concurring and dissenting opinions add uncertainty without
adding corresponding value.
As Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1973, “There are those who suggest that today’s
Court is too prone to produce separate opinions, and that if there were fewer of
them, there would be more time to deliberate and to write opinions for the
Court.” 75 The author is one of those individuals. Chief Justice Marshall’s
characterization of the Supreme Court’s duty “to say what the law is” has been
transformed into a modern exercise of overwriting and under-deciding. And,
while some might argue that a separate opinion “is an appeal to present and future
70. Lerner & Lund, supra note 44, at 1276.
71. In fairness, Lerner and Lund do not call for an end to separate opinions. See id.
72. Id. at 1283.
73. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/PR73-NY74].
74. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
75. Rehnquist, supra note 24, at 363.
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[Justices] to see the light,” there are more effective methods of persuasion. 76 More
importantly, the Court’s duty is to say what the law is—not what it should be.
The cacophony of voices is muddying the waters—not clarifying the law.
V. SOMETHING WORTH STRIVING FOR: CLARITY, READABILITY
During his confirmation proceeding, Chief Justice Roberts professed his desire
to write accessible opinions and take more cases.
I hope we haven’t gotten to the point where the Supreme Court’s opinions
are so abstruse that the educated lay person can’t pick them up and read
them and understand them. You shouldn’t have to be a lawyer to understand
what the Supreme Court opinions mean. . . . I hope we haven’t gotten to
the point where that is an unattainable ideal. . . . But I do think that’s
something that it’s worth shooting for, at least in most cases, that opinions
should be accessible to educated people without regard to whether they’re
lawyers or not. 77
Thus far, Chief Justice Roberts has not delivered. But there is time to change.
Were the Court to place its energies on simply saying what the law is, society
would benefit from shorter and clearer opinions. Without collectively drafting
thirty-one more separate opinions than majority opinions each Term, the Court
will have more time to decide the important legal matters of the day. Without
spending twice as much time drafting non-decisional opinions, the Justices will
have time to work on collaboration—on reaching consensus and returning the
Court to its decisional roots. After all, the primary duty of the Supreme Court is
to decide. And the author thinks that’s something worth shooting for.

76. Id.
77. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 385 (statement of John G. Roberts Jr.).

